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ENEMY AT THE GATES: How CAN INVESTORS
STOP HEDGE-FUND MANAGERS FROM
UNNECESSARILY SUSPENDING REDEMPTIONS?
STEPHEN L. BONASSO*
I. INTRODUCTION
Randy Lerner, the billionaire owner of the Cleveland Browns football
franchise and the Aston Villa soccer club,' is no stranger to hard times in
the sporting arena.2 But in 2010, he also suffered a setback with his
investment portfolio when trying to redeem a $40,000,000 investment from
the hedge fund, Paige Capital Management, LLC (Paige Capital).' The
fund's managers, Michele and Christopher Paige, apparently parked most
of Mr. Lerner's investment in cash for two years, refused to fully disclose
where the money was invested and collected management and incentive
fees on the assets.4 When Mr. Lerner notified Christopher Paige of his
desire to.redeem his assets, Mr. Paige responded with a particularly nasty
letter threatening litigation and restriction of Mr. Lerner's withdrawal.5
Juris Doctor, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, expected 2013.
Randolph Lerner, FORBES (Mar. 2011), http://www.forbes.com/profile/randolph-
lerner. Randy Lerner is the 393rd richest American, having inherited his fortune
including ownership of the Cleveland Browns) from his father, Al Lerner.
Brian Solomon, The Best and Worst NFL Owners, FORBES (Nov. 2, 2011),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2011/11/02/the-best-and-worst-nfl-
owners.html. Randy Lerner was named fourth worst NFL owner, based on his
team's poor performance on the field and lack of financial growth.
3 Jef Feeley, Cleveland Browns' Lerner to Get Fund Investment Back, Delaware
Judge Rules, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 9, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-
08-08/browns-lerner-to-get-investment-in-hedge-fund-back-judge-rules.html.
4 Paige Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Lerner Master Fund, LLC, No. CIV.A.5502-CS,
2011 WL 3505355, at *6, *8, *13 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 2011). Mr. Paige's letter
contained the following language:
[W]e are fully prepared to litigate this matter to the bitter end
because we will continue to manage your money, and collect
management and incentive fees, until this matter is resolved
many years hence. The economic reality, therefore, is that you
cannot win because you will spend more litigating than we're
fighting over.
Id. at *13. The analysis of the Delaware Chancery Court's opinion will be
discussed later in this note. See discussion infra Part V.A.
51d. at *13.
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This letter, which Mr. Paige fiercely sought to keep out of evidence at
trial,6 embodies the worst intentions a hedge-fund manager could have
when deciding to restrict or suspend an investor's redemption rights.7
Despite their Ivy League legal training, the Paiges did not turn out to -be
great hedge-fund managers, as Michele Paige's only investment decision
while managing Paige Capital (and other related entities) was to forestall
investment because she thought she could acquire assets at a lower price if
she waited. 8 This story highlights one of the possible perils that hedge-fund
investors face when handing over large sums of money to managers who
may not be equipped to manage it.
Hedge funds are investment vehicles that often use risky investment
strategies.9 These strategies allow funds to achieve positive returns
regardless of market conditions.1° Hedge funds have also been called
"absolute return funds" because their claims of generating positive returns
under all market conditions. However, the recent economic downturn made
it clear that hedge funds can no longer label themselves as such. 1
Nevertheless, despite their recent losses, hedge funds have continued to
outperform the overall market, 2 and research over the past two decades
bears this out.' 3 To avoid more stringent regulation, these funds restrict
participation to -individuals with a high net worth, usually with minimum
investments of $5,000,000,14 and often use derivative instruments or engage
in short selling to limit their market exposure."5 These funds have
historically enjoyed little regulatory oversight, and they have not been
required to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); 16
6id.
7 Interestingly, Mr. Paige was running for the Republican nomination for a U.S.
House of Representatives seat in northeastern Pennsylvania, and his decision to
drop out of the race coincided with his letter to Mr. Lerner. Feeley, supra note 3.
8 Paige Capital Mgmt., LLC, 2011 WL 3505355, at *3, *12.
9 Jane J. Kim, Concerns Grow About Prospects of Hedge Funds: Wall Street
Strategists Warn That Results May Languish; Past Returns Also Questioned, WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 15, 2004), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 110306065772900022.html.
0 Id
.
" Houman B. Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds: Financial
Innovation and Investor Protection, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 240, 245 (2009).
12 Id.
13 Hennessee Hedge Fund Index in the Worst 15 Months of S&P Decline (1993-
2010), HENNESSEE GROUP LLC,
http://www.hennesseegroup.com/indices/retums/downmarketanalysis.html (last
visited Mar. 27, 2012). The graph from Hennessee represents the "absolute-retum"
nature of hedge funds, detailing the limited losses (and evten gains) in comparison
to the market's steepest declines over the past two decades.
14 DOUGLAS L. HAMMER ET AL., U.S. REGULATION OF HEDGE FUND INVESTORS, 75
(2005).
15 Kim, supra note 9.
16 Dale A. Oesterle, Regulating Hedge Funds, 1 ENTREPREN. Bus. L.J., 1, 3 (2006).
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however, recent legislation will soon implement increased regulation while
requiring larger fund managers to register. 17 The funds' managers typically
charge management fees of I to 2% and performance fees of 20%. 18
During the financial crisis of 2008, the hedge-fund industry was
flooded with investor redemption requests, which consequently led fund
managers to impose redemption "gates" that were designed to limit
redemptions that exceeded a certain percentage of a fund's assets. 19 Prior to
2008, redemption gates were not used regularly20 and often their use
signaled the effective end of a hedge fund.2' When a fund manager
suspended redemptions, it was like a self-fulfilling prophecy that the fund
would be unable to continue operation and pay out the requested
redemptions.22 Because the use of redemption gates exploded in 2008,23 it is
important to examine the legality and enforceability of these "gate"
provisions in the context of the contracts and investment agreements that
allow their use. Even though funds have better matched their liquidity
profile with their redemption profile in the past few years,24 hedge funds
could see another round of sizable redemption requests after lackluster
performance in 201 1.25
This note will address the recent use and abuse of redemption gates in
hedge funds, and explore solutions for their continued use when
appropriately imposed. First, it will discuss how hedge funds are structured,
17 Andrew Ackerman, Global Finance: Rules for Hedge Funds Get Pruned-SEC
Backs Requirement for Periodic Reports, but Only Largest Firms Must File on
quarterly Basis, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2011, at C3.
Kim, supra note 9.
19 Joseph Checkler, Selling Hedge-Fund Stakes, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2008, at D5.
20 George Zuckerman, Hedge-Fund Investor Goal: An Exit Plan, WALL ST. J., Sept.
9, 2009, at C1 [hereinafter Exit Plan].
21 Symposium, A Fistful of Dollars: Hedge Funds, Private Equity and Bankruptcy,
A Symposium: Into the Sunset: Bankruptcy as Scriptwriter of the Denouement of
Financial Distress, 7 DEPAUL Bus. & COMM. L.J. 597 (2008-2009) [hereinafter
Fistful of Dollars].
22 Id.
23 George Zuckerm an, Hedge-Fund Gate Bashing Yields Little, WALL ST. J., June
24, 2009, at C 14 [hereinafter Bashing Yields Little] (stating that more than 15% of
all hedge funds imposed restrictions on investor redemptions during the market
crisis in 2008).
24 Amy Or, Hedge Funds' 3Q Is Fourth Worst Quarterly Performance, Dow JONES
NEWSWfRES (Oct. 7, 2011, 4:15PM), http://www.djnewsplus.com/rssarticle/
SB 13 1801826083291203.html.
25 Steve Eder, Hedge Funds Face Investor Pruning, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2011, at
C 1; Margot Patrick, Hedge Funds Face New Round of Redemptions, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/hedge-funds-face-new-round-
of-redemptions-2011-09-28.
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how fund managers are compensated and how managers and investors
contract. Second, it will discuss the process by which investors enter and
exit hedge-fund partnerships. Third, it will explore the reasons for
redemption gates and whether gates are truly necessary. Fourth, it will
discuss the recent court ruling in Delaware regarding the legality and
enforceability of redemption gates. Lastly, it will offer solutions on how
fund investors and fund managers can act more cooperatively to create a
balanced approach to maintaining liquidity for exiting investors, while
preserving capital for the funds' remaining investors.
II. How ARE HEDGE FUNDS STRUCTURED AND WHAT DOCUMENTS
ARE CONTROLLING?
This section will explore how hedge funds are structured and the
reasons for their structure. First, it will discuss the statutory framework in
which hedge funds operate. Second, it will discuss the statutory exemptions
that allow the existence of hedge funds. Third, it will examine the
organizational and compensation structures that hedge funds employ.
Fourth, it will discuss the ongoing controversy over hedge-fund manager
compensation. Finally, it will discuss the documents that are used to create
hedge-fund partnerships.
A. The Statutory Basis Allowing the Creation of Hedge Funds
The statutory basis for hedge funds lies in the funds' regulatory
exemptions from parts of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act),26 the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), the Investment Company Act
of 1940 (Company Act)27 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
(Advisers Act).28 Although recent legislation changes the way some of
these exemptions apply,29 hedge funds have historically been exempt from
the public offering registration requirements of the 1933 Act,30 the reporting
obligations of the 1934 Act and the registration requirements of the
Company Act. 31 Hedge funds have enjoyed important exemptions
stemming from either of two exclusions created in the definition of an
investment company in the 1940 Act.32 These funds can avoid being
considered investment companies because they do not have more than 100
investors (the fund itself can be considered a manager's only client)33 or
26 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2006).
27 Id. § 80a-3(c)(7); id. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A).
28 Id. § 80b-3(b)(3).
29 Ackerman, supra note 17.
30 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2).
3 Id. § 80a-3(c)(7); id. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A).
32 Oesterle, supra note 16, at 5.
13 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7).
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because they only allow investors that are "qualified purchasers" (including
individuals with over $5,000,000 in investments).34
Although hedge funds are exempted from the regulations of the
Company Act,35 hedge-fund managers may be considered investment
advisers as defined in the Advisers Act and thereby fall under its
regulation. 36 Hedge-fund managers, like all investment advisers under the
Advisers Act, are prohibited from making material misstatements, making
misleading omissions and committing fraud.37 But-managers can be
exempted from the registration requirements under the Advisers Act if they
qualify as a private adviser. 38 A private adviser must not have advised more
than fifteen clients in the previous twelve months (each different fund being
a different client), must not hold itself out to the public and must not advise
a registered investment company (as defined by the Company Act).39 Hedge
funds also gain exemption from the 1933 Act by only making private
offerings and by limiting their investors to those with "accredited investor"
status.40 Accredited investors, under the 1933 Act, are those whose net
worth exceeds $1,000,000 or who have earned $200,000 or more in each of
the last two years.41
B. The Reasoning for Allowing Hedge-Fund Exemptions
Inherent in these exemptions used by hedge-fund inanagers is the
understanding that hedge funds will not actively advertise to the public and
that the funds will limit their investors to those who can sustain the
increased investment risk. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an offering to
investors who are able to fend for themselves (e.g. sophisticated and
informed investors) is not a public offering, and therefore it is an exempt
transaction. 'A2 Regulatory requirements and the investors' perceived level
of sophistication allow managers to impose liquidity restriction on
investors.43 These investors are wealthy enough to be informed of the
inherent risks associated with their investment. 44 Because of the sheer size
of the hedge-fund industry, lawmakers have been concerned that lack of
regulation could result in real systematic risk for the financial system.45 The
34 Id. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A).
31 Id. § 80b-3(b)(3).
36 Shadab, supra note 11, at 255.
37 Id. at 256 (discussing 17 C.F.R § 275.206(4)-8 (2011)).38 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3).
39 Shadab, supra note 11, at 258.40 Id. at 258-59.
41 Id. at 259.
42 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124-25 (1953).
43 See Shadab, supra note 11, at 259.
44 See id.
45 Bart Mallon, Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, HEDGE FUND L.
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numbers tell a different story, however, because in the recent economic
downturn, hedge funds lost only around 18% on average, while the market
overall lost around 40%.46 Regardless of whether the need for regulation is
real, Congress enacted legislation increasing regulatory oversight, which
will be implemented soon; however, some efforts to delay its
implementation and limit its original scope have been successful.
47
C. The Business and Compensation Structures that Hedge Funds Employ
Hedge funds are typically structured as limited partnerships or limited
-liability compauies (LLCs).48 Some foreign hedge funds, known as offshore
funds, are structured as limited corporations and are domiciled outside the
United States, usually in the Cayman Islands or the British Virgin Islands.49
In the most common structure, the limited partnership, there are two types
of partners: limited partners and a general partner.50 The limited partnership
structure also allows for favorable tax treatment for the partners, in that the
gains and losses of the partnership are passed through and thereby only
taxed once at the individual partner level. 5'
The general partner is usually the fund's portfolio manager and is in
charge of managing all other aspects of the fund's business.52 The general
partner owes fiduciary duties to the limited partners, and while it controls
all of the fund's decision-making, it is only bound by the terms of the
partnership agreement.53 The general partner is subject to unlimited liability
for any unsatisfied debts of the partnership, but most general partners are
organized as LLCs, thus easily limiting the personal liability of the
individual controlling the organization.54 In contrast to the general partner,
a limited partner maintains very little, if any, control of the partnership's
decision-making, and thereby limits its own liability stemming from the
partnership.55 A limited partner's investment alone does not make it
BLOG (June 26, 2008), http://www.hediefundlawblog.com/wall-street-reform-and-
consumer-protection-act.html.46 Shadab, supra note 11, at 243-44.
47 Ackerman, supra note 17.
48 HAMMER ET AL., supra note 14, at 88.
49 Bart Mallon, Offshore Hedge Funds-Structure and Considerations, HEDGE
FUND L. BLOG (Sept. 26, 2008), http://www.hedgefundlawblog.com/offshore-
hedge-funds-structure-and-considerations.html.
This note will focus mainly on limited partnerships domiciled in the United States,
because many offshore funds are simply created as a "shell" for foreign investors.
50 HAMMER ET AL., supra note 14, at 88-89.
51 Shadab, supra note 11, at 249.
51 HAMMER ET AL., supra note 14, at 89, 94.
53 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101 (c), (d) (2011).
54 Shadab, supra note 11, at 249 (discussing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-403).
55 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-303.
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responsible for the liabilities of the fund, and the major down side risk
facing a limited partner is the loss of its investment.56
D. The Controversy Surrounding Hedge-Fund Manager Compensation
Hedge-fund manager compensation is a controversial issue,57 especially
with many managers earning massive fees in recent years, despite the
economic recession.58 Fund managers typically charge management fees
ranging from 1 to 2% per annum of the fund's assets under management
(usually calculated at the beginning of the period, either monthly or
quarterly).59 The use of management fees as a way to compensate money
managers is very common throughout the investment industry, and it is not
limited to only hedge-fund managers. 60 However, investment advisers to
investment companies are prohibited from charging performance fees,
while hedge-fund managers are not.61 Hedge-fund managers draw a
significant portion of their compensation from the performance fee
structures they employ. 62 Their performance fees (also called incentive fees,
carve out or "the carry") typically range from 15 to 20% of the fund's
gains.63 These performance fees, usually charged on an annual basis, can be
as high as 40% of the fund's gains.64
. The fund usually has to outperform some predetermined benchmark
and/or be above the fund's "high-water mark" before a manager can charge
incentive fees.65 Because high-water marks are used to limit managers'
compensation, it is understandable that managers will try to find creative
ways to avoid having their funds "underwater." For example, after the
recent economic downturn, some managers whose funds had lost significant
value decided to voluntarily close their funds and return investors' capital
56 See id.
51 Zachery Kouwe, Hedge Funds Challenged Over Fees, DEALBOOK (Sept. 17,
2009, 12:16 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/09/1 7/hedge-funds-
challenged-over-fees/.58 Nelson D. Schwartz & Louise Story, Hedge Fund Pay Roars Back, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 1, 2010, atB1.
59 Shadab, supra note 11, at 250.
60 Id. (discussing SEC, Invest Wisely: An Introduction to Mutual Funds (Aug. 8,
2007)).
61 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a)(1) (2006).
62 Oesterle, supra note 16, at 39 (discussing SEC Staff Report to the SEC:
Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds, at 109 (Sept. 2003)).
63 James R. Barth et al., Hedge Funds: Risks and Returns in Global Capital
Markets, MILKEN INST. 32-34 (Dec. 2006).
64 ARTHUR MACEWAN & JOHN A. MILLER, ECONOMIC COLLAPSE, ECONOMIC
CHANGE: GETTING TO THE ROOTS OF THE CRISIS 101 (2011).
65 Joseph Checkler, Funds Inch Past the High-Water Mark, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12,
2011, at C1.
146 OHIO STATE ENTREPRENEURIAL Vol. 7:1
BUSINESS LA WJOURNAL
rather than stay open and try to recoup their losses.66 Managers did this not
only because staying open and regaining their losses would be difficult, but
also because their compensation for such positive performance of their
funds would be far less lucrative in view of investors' high-water marks.
67
However, many notable hedge funds that remained open had regained their
high-water marks by the end of 2009.68 Historically, hedge funds as a group
have not had difficulty outperforming the benchmarks that are set by
market.
69
The tax treatment of managers' performance fees adds to the
controversy over managers' compensation. Briefly, the controversy arises
because the performance fees charged by managers enjoy tax treatment at
long-term capital gains rates (currently 15%) instead of ordinary-income
rates (currently a maximum marginal rate of 35%). 70 The main argument
for this treatment is that the fees are technically the managers' share of the
funds' investment returns, which are gains or losses from owning long-term
capital assets, therefore such gains should be taxed at long-term capital
gains rates.71 Congress has looked to change the tax treatment of
performance fees and "carried interest" at different times in the past, but
now with increased pressure from the Obama administration to close tax
loopholes and with added pressure to increase revenue, Congress may act
soon to classify performance fees as ordinary income.
It is important to note that a significant portion of the hedge-fund
industry is made up of hedge funds that invest only in other hedge funds.
73
These hedge funds, which invest in an assortment of other hedge funds and
are commonly known as "funds of funds," can be quite large.74 Their goal is
66 id.
67 id.
68 See id
69 Growth of a $1000 Dollar Chart For HHFI and Benchmarks (1987-2010),
HENNESSEE GROUP LLC, http://www.hennesseegroup.com/indices/retums/
dollargrowth.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). The graph from Hennessee
represents how hedge funds generally outperform the overall market, even during
the recent economic crisis. The market is sometimes used as a benchmark for so-
called "preferred-return" or "high-water mark" calculations.
70 Laura Saunders, Tax Report: 'Carried Interest' in the Cross Hairs, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 6, 2011, atB9.
71 id
72 Id. For an in depth discussion of the controversy surrounding the "carried
interest," see also Taxing Partnership Profits Interests: The Carried Interest
Problem, 124 HARv. L. REV. 1773 (2011); David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of
Carried Interests in Private Equity, 94 VA. L. REV. 715 (2008).
73 Cassell Bryan-Low, Not Much Fun Now With the Fund of Funds, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 3, 2008, at Cl.74 Largest Hedge Fund of Fund Managers, INVESTMENT NEWS (Sept. 22, 2008,
6:01 AM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20080922/CHART/809199974.
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to diversify risk across a "basket" of hedge funds75 and to provide an
average hedge-fund investor exposure to more funds than it would
otherwise be able to invest in (because the minimum investment
requirements of each fund in the basket may be prohibitive). Because fund
of funds invest exclusively in other hedge funds, their investors pay a
second layer of fees.76 As an investor in another hedge fund, a fund of funds
pays a management fee on the assets it invests and also pays an incentive
fee on any gains that are passed through to it, creating the first layer of
fees.77 The fund of funds then charges its own management fee (up to 1.5%)
and incentive fee (5 to 10% on gains), creating a second layer of fees which
it passes through to its investors.78 These funds, with their fee-layering and
large size, face administrative difficulties, including decreased investment
liquidity from the underlying funds, and as a result many are forced to hold
more of their assets in cash at certain times in order to meet redemption
requests.79
E. The Documents that Control Hedge-Fund Partnerships
Hedge-fund offering documents generally are similar to a mutual fund
prospectus and contain three main documents: a private placement
memorandum; a limited partnership agreement; and a set of subscription
documents.8 ° Hedge-fund managers use detailed operating agreements to
structure their funds and to define the rights and duties of the general
partner and limited partners. 81 The legal rights of limited partners are
determined by the limited partnership agreement.82 Delaware limited
partnership law is seen as enabling and generally allows the parties to
structure the different aspects of the partnership agreements, including
capital redemptions, as they see fit.83 The flexibility of partnership law does
not practically limit the way an operating agreement is structured.84
75 Bryan-Low, supra note 73.
76 id.
77 Shadab, supra note 11, at 250.
78 Bryan-Low, supra note 73.
79 id.
80 Bart Mallon, Hedge Fund Offering Documents, HEDGE FUND L. BLOG (Aug. 3,
2008), http://www.hedgefundlawblog.com/monthly-feature-hedge-fund-offering-
documents.html.
81 Shadab, supra note 11, at 249.
82 HAMMER ET AL., supra note 14, at 97.
83 See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-702(a) (2011); Ron S. Geffner,
Delaware-The Hedge Fund Jurisdiction of Choice in the US (Feb. 11, 2008) (on
file with author). According to Mr. Geffner, the flexibility and ease of creation
provided by Delaware partnership law make it the preeminent choice for domestic
hedge funds.
84 Shadab, supra note 11, at 249.
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As mentioned previously, limited partners retain almost no control over
their investments, other than to redeem their capital; and the flexibility of
the law allows them to voluntarily give up that decision-making ability
through the operating agreement. 85 Hedge funds generally make only
private offerings to potential investors86  using private offering
memorandums, which often contain information about a fund's structure
and investment strategy. s7 On the one side, hedge-fund managers, desiring
to maintain regulatory exemptions, make private offerings with documents
that are generally one-sided and not fully negotiated. While on the other
side, hedge-fund investors, desiring to maintain limited liability, willingly
accept the lack of control outlined in the agreements. This dynamic gives
rise to the problem where investors do not have the power to redeem their
capital because they have given managers the right to suspend such
redemptions.
Il1. How DO LIMITED PARTNERS
ENTER AND EXIT A HEDGE FUND?
This section will examine the process and mechanics by which
investors join and leave hedge funds. Typically, when a manager solicits an
investment, it will give a prospective hedge-fund investor a private
placement memorandum, sometimes called the offering document.88 These
documents must provide the investors with similar information to what
would be available for public offerings including: a description of the
business, the investment interest being offered, important risk factors about
the fund, information about the investment strategy, use of the investor's
subscription proceeds and length of the "lock-up" period.89 However,
because these documents are private and because managers desire to keep
their actual investment positions secret, the offering documents tend to be
vague in their description of the fund and its investments, and the
prospective investor is unlikely to glean much meaningful information from
them.90 If the investor decides to enter the fund as a limited partner, it will
receive the operating agreement or partnership agreement, which fully
details the rights and duties of the parties.9' The investor will also receive
subscription documents that detail the terms of purchase,92 which it must
85 Id. at 247-48.
86 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2006).
87 Shadab, supra note 11, at 258.
88 Mallon, supra note 80.89 Shadab, supra note 11, at 258 (citing SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119,
125-26 (1953)).
90 Ryan Sklar, Note, Hedges or Thickets: Protecting Investors From Hedge Fund
Managers' Conflicts ofInterest, 77 FORDiHAM L. REv. 3251, 3322 (2009).
91 HAMMER ET AL., supra note 14, at 97.
92 rJ
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execute and return, usually accompanying its actual cash investment into
the fund.93
A. Entering a Hedge Fund
The offering memorandum, partnership agreement or subscription
documents will outline the strategy and restrictions of the investment, the
length of the "lock-up" period and the amount of management and
incentive fees that will be charged on the investment. 94 Many funds lock-up
investors for a minimum period of time upon their subscription into the
fund by disallowing redemptions, usually for six to twenty-four months. 95
Some managers provide tiered fee structures through which they allow
investors to opt for longer lock-up periods in order to incur lower fees.
96
However, lock-up periods have historically been short, 97 and in the wake of
the recent economic crisis, investors have increasingly been able to bargain
for decreased fees and reduction or elimination of lock-up periods.98
Different funds have different liquidity periods based on their
investment strategy.99 For example, some hedge funds have strategies
similar to private equity funds (typically longer-term and less liquid than
hedge funds) and therefore cannot offer liquidity like a normal "long-short"
hedge fund that invests only in stocks or other short-term investments. 100
While this lack of liquidity may seem harsh, it is fully disclosed by the
manager and accepted by the investor prior to the investor's subscription of
capital.' O'
Fund of funds have unique liquidity concerns, not the least of which is
the differing lock-up periods for its underlying investments. 102 As a result,
fund of funds often require longer notice periods for their investors'
redemption requests, because they in turn must make redemption requests
93 Mallon, supra note 80.
94 HAMMER ET AL., supra note 14, at 96-97.
951d. at3.
96 Bei Hu, Hedge Funds Lower Fees, Lengthen Lockups on New Funds,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 3, 2008, 12:49 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aV5d_zNyBLfM&refer-home.
97 Oesterle, supra note 16, at 4.
98 Exit Plan, supra note 20.
99 Id.100 Id.
101 Bart Mallon, Hedge Fund Redemptions and the Gate Provision, HEDGE FUND L.
BLOG (Sept. 29, 2008), http://www.hedgefundlawblog.com/hedge-fund-
redemptions-and-the-gate-provision.html.
102 David Shastri, Painting a Clearer Picture: Fund of Funds are In Search of
Clarity in Their Cash Flow, HEDGE FUND J. (Dec. 2007), http://www.thehedge
fund joumal.com/magazine/200712/technical/funds-of-funds-are-in-search-of-
clarity-in-their-cash-flow.php.
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from their portfolio funds.10 3 If a hedge fund has enough short-term or
liquid assets to meet its redemption requests, it would have few reasons to
lower a "gate," and even if it did not have liquid enough assets for
redemptions, the fund is not required to suspend redemptions.,0 4 However,
major problems can arise for both hedge funds and fund of funds when such
funds are invested in illiquid or thinly traded positions (including other
hedge funds) and receive redemption requests that exceed the amount of
their short-term or liquid assets. 105
B. Exiting a Hedge Fund
Hedge funds have different redemption procedures than other
investment vehicles such as private equity funds or mutual funds. 10 6 One of
the main differences between a hedge fund and a private equity fund is the
frequency with which investors can liquidate their investment and gain
access to the proceeds. 10 7 Once a limited partner's capital is available for
redemption (after the initial lock-up period), it must give appropriate notice
of redemption in order to receive its redemption proceeds.' 0 The notice
periods are typically thirty days for a fund with monthly liquidity
provisions or sixty to ninety days for funds with quarterly or annual
liquidity provisions. 10 9 In contrast to mutual funds, which are valued daily,
hedge funds are usually only valued on a monthly or quarterly basis." 0 If an
investor has made a proper redemption request, then it can receive its
redemption proceeds after the net asset value (the "NAy") of a fund is
"struck"."' Funds typically apply a 10% holdback to redemption payments
for any year-end audit adjustments that might take place (and pay out the
balance of the redemption after the audit is signed). 1 2 Because hedge funds
can have very short redemption periods, managers have designed tools for
stemming the outflow of assets, namely redemption gates.
103 id.
104 Mallon, supra note 101.
105 Fistful of Dollars, supra note 21.
106 Jonathan Bevilacqua, Note, Convergence and Divergence: Blurring the Lines
Between Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 54 BUFF. L. REv. 251, 262
(2006).
107 id.
108 ScoTr J. LEDERMAN, HEDGE FUND REGULATION § 2:3.3 (2007).
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110 Id. § 2:2.4.
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IV. HEDGE-FUND "GATES": WHAT ARE THEY AND
WHY ARE THEY NECESSARY?
This section first will examine what redemption gates are and how they
function. Second, it will discuss the positive aspects and economics benefits
of imposing gates. Third, it will examine the events of the economic crisis
that caused many hedge-fund managers to impose gates. Lastly, it will
discuss the negative consequences of imposing gates and the possibility of
their inappropriate use.
A. What are Gates?
A hedge-fund gate is a mechanism used to limit the amount of assets
that can be withdrawn from a fund during any one redemption period." 3 If
a hedge-fund investor requests the return of its capital that is eligible for
redemption, the manager may deny the request under certain
circumstances.' 4 Most hedge-fund agreements give the managers the
option to restrict or suspend investor redemptions if the aggregate amount
of redemptions goes above a predetermined percentage (usually 20%, but
sometimes as low as 10%, of the fund's assets)." 5 Investors have the option
to try to force a liquidation of the fund" 6 (a "winding-up," almost an
equivalent to a hedge-fund bankruptcy), but for reasons set out later in this
note, forcing a liquidation may not always be in the best interest of the
investors." 7 When redemptions are restricted or gated, the manager will
calculate the total amount of the funds' capital available for redemption
based on the agreed upon percentage, and then return that capital on a pro-
rata basis among the redeeming investors based on the amount of each
request. " 18
Generally, after a gate has been imposed, there is no stated time by
which it must be lifted.'19 In fact, some offering documents allow managers
to completely suspend redemptions if there is a major or catastrophic event
that impairs the value of the portfolio. 20 Not until recently were the
mechanics and reasoning behind hedge-fund gates understood or
1'3 Bart Mallon, What is a "Gate " Provision?, HEDGE FUND L. BLOG (Aug. 1,
2008), http://www.hedgefindlawblog.com/what-is-a-gate-provision.html.
114 LEDERMAN, supra note 108.
115 Mallon, supra note 113.
116 Bashing Yields Little, supra note 23.
117 See'discussion of timing issues with investor redemption requests and hedge-
fund liquidations, infra Part IV.B.
118 Mallon, supra note 101.
19 Fistful of Dollars, supra note 21.
120 Mallon, supra note 101.
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scrutinized so heavily."2 ' Prior to 2008, most investors never envisioned a
scenario where funds would be gated in mass. 122 With the benefit of
hindsight, many investors see an investment's liquidity as a top priority
when seeking new investments and exiting current investments.
123
Hedge funds use another common strategy that is similar to a
redemption gate to mitigate the loss of their capital, known as "side-
pocketing., 12 4 Side pockets are used to segregate and match redemption
requests with illiquid assets. 125 The side pocket allows a manager to "clean-
up" some illiquid investments before paying out redemptions; however
some investors who requested redemptions two to three years ago are still
awaiting their full return of capital because they were placed in a side
pocket.
126
B. Are Gates Necessary?
In general, hedge funds use liquidity restrictions (e.g. not allowing their
shares to be traded) in order to maintain their regulatory exemptions and to
maintain their preferred partnership structure (with its incumbent tax
benefits). 121 While the necessity of hedge-fund gates has been hotly debated
lately, 128 it is clear that funds will continue to use gates as long as investors
continue to agree to them. 129 There are pros and cons on either side of the
debate and this note will discuss them in turn.
1. Positive Aspects of Imposing a Gate
There are economic benefits that can be gained by imposing a
redemption gate. Gating excess redemption requests may benefit the fund
(and the investors) in the long-term, because a large redemption of capital
121 Exit Plan, supra note 20.
122 Fistful of Dollars, supra note 21.
123 Id.
124 Matthew A. Feldman & Jennifer L. Dudanowicz, Hedge Fund Liquidations:
Deciding What To Do When Investors Ask For Their Money Back, 241 N.Y. L.J. 9
(2009), available at http://www.willkie.com/files/tbls29Publications%5CFile
Upload5686%5C2914%5CHedge%2OFund%2OLiquidations.pdf. For further
discussion of the recent use and abuse of "side pocketing," see Jenny Strasburg,
SEC Probes 'Side Pocket'Arrangements, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 2010, at C 1.
125 Feldman & Dudanowicz, supra note 124.
126 Christine Williamson, Hedge Funds Have $100 Billion Still Locked Up,
PENSIONS & INVS., (May 26, 2011), http://www.pionline.com/article/
20110516/PRJNTSUB/305169963/.
127 LEDERMAN, supra note 108.
128 Peter Lattman & Jenny Strasburg, Clients Flee Cerberus, Fallen Fund Titan,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2009, at Al.
129 See Eder, supra note 25.
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at a given time may disrupt the fund's operations and force the fund to act
inconsistently with its trading strategy.130 Gating excess redemption
requests helps to protect the fund's assets because hedge funds often hold
large positions in illiquid assets and requiring a fund to liquidate such
positions would likely cause severe impairment to the investment value.1 31
The fund wants to prevent having to unload assets at discounted price
resulting from a "run on the fund"; this untimely liquidation inadvertently
punishes the remaining investors while only benefiting the liquidity (and
not necessarily the economic position) of exiting investors. 32 Investors tend
to get antsy when they cannot access to their money, 33 but just because an
investment lacks liquidity, it is not necessarily a bad investment.! 34 Often
illiquid investments realized sizable gains when they eventually become
liquid. 135 Some funds in 2009 were even raising capital to invest in certain
illiquid investments being dumped on the market by other funds that had to
satisfy "runs"'(due to the glut of investor redemptions at the time).136
Another reason for imposing gates is that funds sometimes hold large
ownership percentages of particular investments (not necessarily illiquid
investments). Funds that hold such large positions of particular investments
want to avoid selling such positions at "fire-sale" prices. While a portfolio's
value impairment from a fire-sale is similar to that from a run on the fund
described above, it has different economic forces behind it. It is evident that
some believe that. gates can be used to prevent fire-sales and runs on the
fund. 137 Although some might argue differently, 13 using a gate to protect
against a fire-sale or run caused by investor panic benefits all the investors
by preventing the spiraling effect caused by the panic. Large hedge funds
can hold very large positions in certain investments, as evidenced by
Cerberus Capital Management's recent struggles. 3 9 Such large funds would
not be wise to liquidate their entire positions instantaneously, because doing
so would require them to artificially increase the supply (and decrease the
selling price) of such positions in the market. 140 This increased supply
would inevitably decrease the remaining value in the portfolio. 14' The fund,
130 Shadab, supra note 11, at 252.
13' Feldman & Dudanowicz, supra note 124.
132 Id.
133 Williamson, supra note 126.
134 Exit Plan, supra note 20.
135 Id.
136 Id.
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by essentially dumping the value of part of its portfolio into the market to
satisfy redemption requests, would impair the portfolio's value for all the
investors, exiting and remaining. 142 This impairment is only exacerbated
when dealing in thinly traded investments. 143 Interestingly, this "crisis"
mentality and rush for the exits by investors has actually created investment
opportunities over the past few years.' 44
Lastly, it is important to note that many managers who imposed gates
saw a major rebound in 2009.145 The industry has lauded the use of gates as
a mechanism that functioned exactly as it was designed, to preserve
investor capital. 146 However, because of the continued delay by many funds
in paying out redemptions, 14 some investors are not convinced that the
managers used these tools for capital preservation, but rather believe that
managers used them for self-preservation. 
148
2. The Recent Economic Crisis' Role in Accentuating the
Different Aspects of Gates
The 2008 financial crisis saw the collapse of the Lehman Brothers.
149
This was an event no one envisioned because many believed the United
States Department of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve would step in as
a backstop.150 The Treasury Department refused to step in because it feared
that it was promoting moral hazard, since it had already helped avert
bankruptcy at Bear Stems earlier in the year.151 Because the Secretary of the
Treasury, Henry Paulson, was formerly employed with Goldman Sachs and
because of his ties within the industry, some accused him of pettiness and
favoritism in saving Bear Stems and not Lehman Brothers. 152 In hindsight,
however, Mr. Paulson and the Treasury Department probably would have
acted to avert the bankruptcy at Lehman Brothers also. 153 The Lehman
Brothers collapse set off a global financial crisis, 15 4 and in its wake a ponzi
scheme run by Bernard Madoff was uncovered, which turned out to be the
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Exit Plan, supra note 20.
145 Schwartz & Story, supra note 58.
146 Exit Plan, supra note 20.
147 Williamson, supra note 126.
148 Bashing Yields Little, supra note 23.
149 Exit Plan, supra note 20.
150 Frontline: Inside the Meltdown (PBS television broadcast Feb. 17, 2009),
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ pages/frontline/meltdown/view/ [hereinafter
Inside the Meltdown].
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largest investor fraud in history. 155 Many of Mr. Madoff's clients were
hedge funds and their sudden demise set off a panic among hedge-fund
managers and investors. 156 Mr. Madoff was convicted of defrauding
investors of almost $13,000,000,000,157 and his fraud likely would have
gone undiscovered if not for the unprecedented financial meltdown.
151
These major banking collapses and hedge-fund fraud served as the
backdrop for the unprecedented fund withdrawals and fund liquidations that
took place in 2008.159
3. Negative Aspects of Imposing a Gate
There are some reasons for imposing redemption gates that are not so
altruistic, and even managers with positive intentions can cause negative or
unintended consequences by imposing gates. The uncertainty and fear
created by Mr. Madoff's scheme reverberated far and wide through the
hedge-fund industry,160 causing the winding-up of many hedge funds, 16'
including large and notable funds like Cerberus Capital Management's
flagship fund 162 and the Fairfield Greenwich Group. 163 Because of the
unprecedented crisis in the industry in 2008 and 2009, many funds, even
those who did their due diligence, were left with massive losses; yet many
managed to stay open through the use of redemption gates and liquidity
restriction) 64 Some have argued that the use of gates in that situation
rewarded bad behavior and shortsighted managers, 165 and the industry is
still uncovering fraud even today.166 Even though redemption gates are
155 Frontline: The MadoffAffair (PBS television broadcast May 12, 2009),
available at http://video.pbs.org/video/I 122731028/.
156Id
"' Robert Frank & Amir Efrati, "Evil" Madoff Gets 150 Years in Epic Fraud-
Victims Cheer Tough Sentence; Judge Slams Financier for Stonewalling
Investigators; True Size of Losses Still a Mystery, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2009, at
Al.
158 Inside the Meltdown, supra note 150.
159 Emily Chasan, Special Report: How Investors Turned the Tables on Hedge
Funds, REUTERS, Mar. 17, 2011, available at http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/
11/03/HedgeFunds.pdf.
160 Inside the Meltdown, supra note 150.
161 Chasan, supra note 159. The graphs in Ms. Chasan's article demonstrate the
backdrop in which many of the gate provisions were enacted in 2008 and 2009.
One shows the staggering amount of fund closures that resulted from the economic
crisis and another represents the net cash outflow from many funds that suffered
from large redemptions.
162 Lattman & Strasburg, supra note 128.
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'
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extremely common across all hedge-fund strategies,167 they usually leave
investors unhappy about not gaining access to their investment capital.
168
Because many of the agreements do not have time limits for gate
impositions, the managers can use their "investment discretion" to
effectively keep the fund open and continue charging management and
incentive fees in perpetuity (or at least until the fund gets sued).' 69
Hedge-fund gates can and do create negative consequences, including
fund managers lowering gates to simply keep funds open in order to collect
fees, the spiraling effect from investor panic that can lead to a fund's
demise 70 and a liquidation problem surrounding which investors are
creditors and which are equity holders. 171 The first problem arises because
managers can collect management fees regardless of the performance of the
fund. Therefore, managers can unscrupulously lower gates in order to
continue collecting their management fees on the gated assets. 172 Because
there are many different reasons that a manager may decide to lower a gate
(other than purely self-preservation) an investor action trying to force the
redemption of an investment will probably be difficult to win unless there is
proof of only self-serving reasons. 1
73
The second problem is essentially a confidence problem that goes on
between investors and a fund's lenders. 74 The fund lowers a gate because
investors are afraid of losses and want to redeem too much of the fund's
capital immediately. 175 Once the fund suspends or restricts redemptions, the
lenders learn that the fund may possibly be going under. 176 The fund's
lenders in turn raise the borrowing costs of the fund, thereby further
pressuring its cash position. 177 The fund's other counterparties may also
exploit the situation by lowering their bids for the fund's assets, thereby
forcing the fund to sell a larger percentage of its position and lose more
money. 17 The idea behind a fund's lowering of a gate is to preserve assets
and meet redemption requests in an orderly fashion, with the ultimate goal
markets/article-2069355/British-fund-manager-Michael-Balboa-faces-fraud-
charges.html?ito=feeds-newsxml.
167 Mallon, supra note 113.
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171 Feldman & Dudanowicz, supra note 124.
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2011 WL 3505355, at *13 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 2011).
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of lifting the gate and continuing operations.1 79 However, many funds fail to
achieve that goal because investors and creditors are unwilling to wait for
the fund's investment strategy to create enough liquidity to survive. 80 The
fund must eventually wind-up and go into liquidation to meet their
outstanding obligations. 81
Another negative consequence of lowering a gate comes when a fund
actually liquidates and there are disputes between investors regarding the
distribution of the fund's assets. If a gate is lowered and the fund eventually
liquidates, there are likely three types of investors: early redeemers, late
redeemers, and non-redeemers (or forced-redeemers). 8 2 The different
investors can actually end up with rights to fund assets that are not entirely
based on their ownership of the fund's equity.' 83 It might not make sense
that some investors would want to remain in the fund, even in the face of
possible bankruptcy, but the following spells out their reasoning:
[A] critical issue faced by liquidating hedge funds is how to
treat early redeeming investors as compared to later
redeeming investors as compared to non-redeeming
investors. It is common, even for funds that have received
an unacceptably high volume of redemptions preventing
them from continuing to operate in the ordinary course, for
some investors not to have given notice of redemption.
Typically, these non-redeeming investors have determined
that they would rather continue owning the "equity" of the
fund on the theory that asset values will recover quickly,
permitting them a greater recovery than if they
redeemed.
184
Disputes arise between investors because the way they are prioritized in
a liquidation, disproportionately to their equity stake, can greatly affect the
actual redemption amount. 185 Early redeemers in a hedge-fund liquidation
will likely argue that they are creditors and not equity holders, because their
redemption requests came before the fund began liquidation and therefore
they are no longer partners in the fund.186 The Delaware Chancery Court
has supported the finding that a withdrawn limited partner becomes a
contract claimant, by stating, "logically and consistent with the plain
meaning of the Delaware Revised Uniform Partnership Act § 17-606(a), it is
179 Williamson, supra note 126.
180 Fistful of Dollars, supra note 21.
181 Id.
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the partnership that owes the distribution to the creditor (i.e., the withdrawn
limited partner)."'' 87 Non-redeemers in a hedge-fund liquidation will argue
against such an approach. 88 They will point out that the timing of the
redemption should not change the true underlying character of the
partnership, and as such, the remaining assets should be split between the
investors in proportion to their percentage of equity in the fund. 8 9 After a
fund's eventual liquidation, and with the benefit of hindsight, this argument
makes sense from a fairness perspective.
Late-redeemers in a hedge-fund liquidation face a problem as to which
approach they should take when arguing for their redemption assets.' 90 A
late-redeeming investor can argue that it should be paid their redemption on
a pro-rata basis, similar to what the non-redeeming investor would argue. 191
However, if the early-redeeming investor prevails with its argument, the
late-redeeming investor will receive less than it would if it had argued
"with" the early-redeeming investor. 192 It makes sense for the late-
redeeming investor to argue with early-redeeming investor, that it is owed
as a creditor and not an equity holder, because it can benefit at the expense
of the non-redeeming investor. 193 However, if both the early and late-
redeeming investors prevail in their arguments, the non-redeeming investor
may lose out on most, if not all, of its remaining capital, simply because it
waited to redeem until after the fund shut down. 'It seems illogical to
punish a hedge-fund investor who remained in a failing fund a little longer
than a comparably situated investor who simply submitted its redemption
request earlier. These negative and unintended consequences and manager
self-preservation issues not only highlight the problems with fund managers
imposing gates, but also undermine the perceived necessity of these
mechanisms.
V. How HAVE DELAWARE COURTS HANDLED CLAIMS
BROUGHT BY INVESTORS' SEEKING THE RETURN OF
THEIR GATED ASSETS?
This section will discuss the recent Delaware Chancery Court opinion
involving a hedge-fund manager's abuse of a redemption gate provision.
First, it will examine the events leading up to the litigation, including the
187 Schuss v. Penfield Partners, L.P., No. CIV.A.3132-VCP, 2008 WL 2433842 at
*4 (Del. Ch. June 13, 2008).
188 Feldman & Dudanowicz, supra note 124.
189 id.
190 Id.
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creation, operation and effective end of Paige Capital. Second, it will
review Chancellor Strine's opinion regarding the contract issues in the case.
Finally, and most importantly, it will discuss the fiduciary duties that the
Court found were owed in the context of hedge-fund managers imposing
redemption gates.
A. Paige Capital-Creation, Inaction and Demise
In the Paige Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Lerner Master Fund, LLC decision,
Chancellor Strine of the Delaware Chancery Court provided a two-pronged
approach for dealing with redemption gate disputes (examining both the
nature of the separately negotiated contracts and the breach of fiduciary
duties). 195 The facts of the case provided an interesting backdrop that
allowed Chancellor Strine to explore common issues with hedge-fund
redemption gates. After a successful run at the hedge fund King Street,
Michele Paige decided to create her own hedge-fund operation. 196 As is
common with hedge-fund organization, Ms. Paige, along with her husband
Christopher Paige, created four different entities to operate their hedge
fund. 197 To organize their investment operation, they actually created two
different -funds, which included an onshore fund and an offshore fund.
198
The entities involved included: 1) Paige LP, the onshore fund; 2) Paige
Opportunity Master Fund, Ltd. (Paige Ltd) the offshore fund; 3) Paige
Capital Management, LLC (Paige Capital), the investment adviser; and 4)
Paige GP, LLC (Paige GP), the general partner for Paige LP.199 The Courts
discussion of entity structure here illustrates just how complex these
agreements can be and it demonstrates that these agreements are not simply
one-to-one transactions, but rather involve multiple entities contracting with
one another.2°0
When creating a hedge fund, managers often.look to core investors to
give them a substantial amount of assets.20 1 This helps to legitimize the
fund and attract new investors.20 2 The early investors can often negotiate
195 Paige Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Lerner Master Fund, LLC, No. CIV.A.5502-CS,
2011 WL 3505355 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 2011). Although this is an unpublished
Memorandum Opinion from the Delaware Chancery Court, it carries significant
weight because of the sheer volume of hedge funds that are organized in the state
of Delaware. See Geffner, supra note 83 (noting the preeminence of Delaware in
hedge-fund organization).
196 Paige Capital Mgmt., LLC, 2011 WL 3505355, at *3.
197 Id.
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favorable terms, which may give them reduced fees or allow them to share
in the management fees or incentive fees on subsequent gains charged to
other investors.20 3 Such terms are often added through side agreements that
are negotiated separately from the partnership agreement and subscription
documents.0 4 The Lerner Master Fund, LLC (Lerner Fund) was an early
and substantial investor in Paige LP and Paige Ltd, and as such, was able to
negotiate a separate agreement (Seeder agreement).2 5 During the
negotiations of the side agreement, there was much debate whether the
partnership agreement (which contained a gating provision) or the Seeder
agreement would be the controlling document.20 6 The Seeder agreement
required a three-year lock-up of the Lerner Fund's initial investment, which
totaled $40,000,000.107 The Seeder agreement also provided the Lerner
Fund with reduced fees, a share of the fees earned from the future investors
and increased information rights, while imposing significant penalties for
any attempt to withdrawal the investment before the end of the lock-up
period.20 8 The Paiges made it clear that they did not intend the Seeder
agreement to supersede the partnership agreement.20 9
The partnership agreement and Seeder agreement were executed in late
2007,210 shortly before the hedge-fund industry began to suffer substantial
losses resulting from the recent financial crisis z.2 1 Through fear, inaction
and ineptitude, Ms. Paige failed to deploy any significant capital during
2122007 and 2008, and as a result did not earned any significant returns.
Because of market forces (and probably because the lack of any real
investor gains), Paige Capital failed to attract any new investors (which
were supposed to provide the fees which were the upside for the lock-up
risk the Lerner Fund had assumed).213 In late 2008, Mr. Lerner (along with
many investors) began to reassess his portfolio to increase liquidity and
focus on operating companies, rather than maintaining passive
investments.214 Through four different meetings with Ms. Paige during that
time, the Lerner Fund became aware of her lack of action, both in investing
Paige Capital's assets and in attracting new investors (or even any prospects
for new investors). 215 After this, the Lerner Fund communicated its desire to
203 Id.
204 Id. at *4.
205 Id,
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redeem its investment at the end of the lock-up period, as provided by the
216Seeder agreement.. In 2009, in spite of these concerns raised by the
Lerner Fund, Ms. Paige still did not deploy Paige Capital's assets because
she thought the market was going to head lower.217 However, her strategy
was terribly misguided, as the market rebounded strongly in 2009.218
As the end of the three-year lock-up period approached, the Lerner
Fund renewed it intentions to withdrawal its investment and filed a
redemption notice with Paige Capital in accordance with the Seeder
agreement. 219 The redemption notice caused the Paiges to react angrily by
threatening to gate the Lerner Fund's assets in accordance with the
partnership agreement. 220 The Paiges then filed a declaratory judgment
action seeking to enact the redemption gate on the Lerner Fund's assets.22'
The Lerner Fund then filed its counterclaims against Paige Capital seeking
the return of its assets. 222 Chancellor Strine's analysis was two-pronged,
focusing on the contract issues at work in the dispute and on the fiduciary
duties owed by the Paiges (as fund managers) to the Lerner Fund (an
investor in Paige LP and Paige Ltd).2 3
B. Paige Capital-Separately Negotiated Contracts
Chancellor Strine found the differences in the contracts and the
intentions of the parties to be dispositive in the case. 24 He focused
specifically on the differences between the redemption rights provisions
225contained in the two agreements. The question at issue was whether the
Seeder agreement prevented the imposition of a redemption gate that was
specifically authorized by the partnership agreement.226 Although the
Seeder agreement expressly said that it should not amend or supersede the
partnership agreement, Chancellor Strine found that the agreements, taken
together and in light of the intentions of the parties, did not contemplate a
redemption gate being lowered on the Lerner Fund at the end of the lock-up
period.22' The Court found that if the Seeder agreement were meant to be
used in conjunction with a redemption gate, it would not have been silent
21161d. at *7.2171 d. at *12.
218 Schwartz & Story, supra note 58.
219 Paige Capital Mgmt., LLC, 2011 WL 3505355, at *12.
220 Id. See discussion of Christopher Paige's letter to the Lemer Fund supra Part I.
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on the issue.228 The Court ruled that the Seeder agreement was the
controlling document that was negotiated between the parties and that it
was not susceptible to more than one meaning. 229 As such, it would have
been improper to use extrinsic evidence (e.g. the partnership agreement
argued for by the Paiges) to try to further interpret the Seeder agreement,
which was sufficiently clear with regard to the issue of redemption gates.230
The Court determined that the Paiges contractually waived the redemption
gate provision of the partnership agreement by negotiating a side agreement
that with the Lerner Fund that was silent on redemption gates.23'
C. Paige Capital-Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Although Chancellor Strine found the contract issue to be dispositive,
the most important aspect of this case was not whether the contracts should
be read either in conjunction or independently of one another. Rather, the
most important aspect for hedge-fund investors was Chancellor Strine's
discussion of fiduciary duties owed by fund managers to hedge-fund
investors.232 The Court found that the Paiges breached their fiduciary duty
to the Lemer Fund as an investor by seeking to impose a redemption gate
for purely selfish reasons.233 He found that the Lemer Fund could have
withdrawn its assets on that basis alone.234 Mr. Lemer acknowledged that
the redemption gate provision was present, but he also looked to other
language in the same clause to show that the Paiges did not fulfill their
fiduciary duties.235 The redemption clause was clear and unambiguous
relating to the ability of the manager to impose redemption restrictions if
more than 20% of the fund's assets were requested at any withdrawal
date.236 However, the clause also stated that the manager, at its sole
discretion could waive or modify the gate for certain large or strategic
investors. Mr. Lerner argued that because the Lemer Fund was
undeniably large and strategic for Paige Capital Management, the failure by
the Paiges to consider "in good faith" waiving the clause for the Lerner
Fund was a breach of fiduciary duty.238 Mr. Lemer argued that as a result of
22 81Id. at *18.
229 Id. at *22.
230 id.
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the breach of fiduciary duty, he was entitled to the return of his
investment.239
The material showing the Paiges' intent to keep the assets locked-up
merely to earn the management fees was the most persuasive evidence that
the Court examined.240 The Court highlighted that Delaware allows the
waiver of fiduciary duties in partnership agreements, but no such waiver
241
was present in Paige Capital's partnership agreement.. Instead, Paige GP
had a clear fiduciary duty to Paige LP, Paige Ltd and the investors, when
deciding to impose a redemption gate.242 The Court found that the reasons
posited by the Paiges for desiring to impose the redemption gate were
completely self-serving and not in the best interest of the funds or the
investors.243 The Paiges did not present any rational reasons for imposing
the gate, and the reasons that were presented merely showed their selfish
intentions.244 Because the Paiges were so inept in the execution of their
duties and because they were unable to show any reason for desiring to
impose a redemption gate, the Court easily concluded that they had
breached their duty by trying to impose the redemption gate.245 In other
cases, it may be less clear, especially if the managers can present any
legitimate reasons for imposing a gate.
VI. WHAT SOLUTIONS ARE AVAILABLE FOR INVESTORS AND
MANAGERS TO MEET THEIR (SOMETIMES COMPETING) GOALS OF
LIQUIDITY AND CAPITAL PRESERVATION?
In framing the problems of hedge-fund redemption gates as those of
manager misappropriation and manager self-preservation, one ignores the
reality that many managers are truly interested in creating investor gains
(sometimes for selfish reasons) and many of them have their own personal
fortunes tied up in their funds.2 46 However, many disputes arise because if
any party has the opportunity and incentive to act improperly regarding
redemption requests, it is the fund manager. Therefore, because the
investors are the "consumers" of the hedge fund's services, solutions to
these problems should focus on investor action. The most obvious and least
cooperative (and probably least practical) solution is for investors simply
not to invest with managers who have redemption gate provisions in the
2 39 Paige Capital Mgmt., LLC, 2011 WL 3505355, at *28.
240 Id. at *32.
241 Id. at *31.
242 Id. at *32.
243 Id
244 Id.
245 Paige Capital Mgmt., LLC, 2011 WL 3505355, at *32.246 Fistful of Dollars, supra note 21.
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offering documents. Until recently, this solution would not have been
possible because nearly all partnership agreements included non-negotiable
redemption gate provisions.247 Also, gates were not often used because their
imposition signaled the effective end of a fund.248 Still, many investors
probably do not have the bargaining power to affect such large changes to a
hedge fund's operations. 249 This solution (of removing gates altogether)
remains unlikely, because most managers (and many investors) see the
collective benefit in including redemption gate provisions and are willing to
allow them for their beneficial purposes. 5
If an investor chooses not to follow the adage of "voting with its feet,"
then it can seek the possibility of restructuring the gate provisions with the
manager. One restructuring option would be to prevent managers from
charging fees on gated assets. This would be a powerful tool to remove the
short-term compensation incentive for managers imposing redemption
gates. Restructuring can include an increase in the threshold of assets
seeking redemption before a gate provision kicks in. Typically gate
provisions allow for gates to be lowered after 20% or more of the funds
assets have been sought for redemption.251 Increasing this number to 40%
or even 60% would severely limit the ability of managers to use gates.
Because raising the percentage of assets would limit the use of gates to
those funds who have only the most severe liquidity issues, this approach
could result in the use of redemption gates again being the first step to
effectively winding-up a fund. Some might argue that this defeats the
252purpose of using gates to protect illiquid investments. However, the
percentages could be kept lower if the investor was aware beforehand that
the fund would employ a highly illiquid investment strategy. Investors
could also negotiate to tie the use of a redemption gates to limited
circumstances of liquidity. One way would be to limit the use of a gate until
all the fund's liquid assets and a certain percentage of the fund's illiquid
assets are used to satisfy the outstanding redemption requests. This would
still allow the fund to mitigate the downside risk of a "fire-sale" on its
assets, while not impairing its portfolio. This would also force the fund to
pay out its short-term investments in the form of redemptions, instead of
possibly holding back payments with the intention of profiting from fees.
Another restructuring option would be to limit the amount of time that a
gate may be imposed. Most agreements do not limit the amount of time for
.which a gate can be used, but rather have blanket language providing for
247 id.
248 Id.
249 id.
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gate imposition on an "as needed" basis.253 Instead of allowing managers to
hold their investments captive indefinitely, investors could negotiate a
provision that ends the use of a redemption gate after six to eighteen
months. Depending on the fund's strategy, an adequate amount of time
could be negotiated in order for the manager either to turn around
performance or to create sufficient liquidity to meet investor redemption
requests. This would prevent investors from facing a situation (which has
been a reality for some recently) where their assets are held for two, three,
254
or even four years without an opportunity to redeem.
Also, investors could bargain to have more information rights triggered
when gates are imposed. This would create a situation where investors can
make better-informed decisions. Some may argue that more information
may create an environment that is even more conducive to a "run on the
fund., 255 However, in theory investors would act in their own best interest,
limiting their redemption requests or possibly even staying in a fund.256 For
example, an investor, after examining the fundamentals and strategy of a
fund, may decide to stay invested even though it is experiencing liquidity
issues because the investor may believe the long-term prospects of the fund
are sound. Conversely, if a fund were suffering from mismanagement, poor
strategy or divergence from previously disclosed strategy, investors would
be better informed to force a liquidation. Regardless, more information
could (and should) help investors act more rationally. One important aspect
of all these solutions is the willingness of hedge-fund managers to bargain
and negotiate with investors for more favorable redemption terms for
investors. These kinds of concessions will assuage investors' liquidity fears
raised during the recent crisis and help investors trust that managers are
acting in the fund's best interest.
Lastly, the most contentious tool investors can use is litigation. The
Delaware Chancery Court has made clear its disfavor for managers using
gates with improper intentions.257 This Court recognizes the necessity for
fund managers to carry out their fiduciary duties and it is apparently willing
to punish managers if they fail to act in the best interest of investors.258 The
most difficult aspect of this strategy for investors is proving the managers'
intent. Because investors can realize very tangible (and numerous) benefits
when managers impose redemption gates, it will be difficult for investors to
253 Fistful of Dollars, supra note 21.
254 Williamson, supra note 126.
255 Chasan, supra note 159.
256 Fisful of Dollars, supra note 21.
257 Paige Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Lerner Master Fund, LLC, No. CIV.A.5502-CS,
2011 WL 3505355, at *2 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 2011).258id.
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show that managers were truly only self-serving in their actions. - 9 As such,
it is in the best interest of investors to find fund managers that have
compensation incentives closely tied with the performance 'of investor
assets. Further, investors are more likely better served if managers invest a
meaningful portion of their own assets in their funds. Because redemption
gates are so harsh on the liquidity rights of investors and because the
necessity of their use is difficult to disprove, investors should focus on the
different options available to them before investing in a hedge fund and
should demand the options that best protect their long-term investment
-goals.
259 See discussion of positive reasons for imposing redemption gates, supra Part
IV.B.
